The political landscape of the Philippines is trembling under the weight of a fractured alliance, and the question on everyone’s mind is no longer if the “UniTeam” is dead, but if President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. (PBBM) can survive the fallout until the end of his term in 2028. In a recent, explosive interview that has sent shockwaves through social media, former Senator Antonio Trillanes IV laid bare the precarious situation of the current administration, revealing details of alleged destabilization plots, the crumbling influence of the Duterte faction, and the looming legal battles that promise to turn 2025 into a political battlefield.

According to Trillanes, the administration has already “weathered the worst” of the challenges. He points to the events surrounding September 21 and November 17 as critical flashpoints where opposition forces, allegedly mobilized by “DDS” (Diehard Duterte Supporters) elements, attempted to create a critical mass for a power shift. The plan, as described by the former senator, was to paralyze Metro Manila with mass protests—hoping to drag influential religious groups like the Iglesia Ni Cristo into the fray—and trigger a withdrawal of support from the military. This scenario was supposedly designed to force a resignation and install Vice President Sara Duterte as the new leader. However, the plan failed spectacularly. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) remained steadfast in their loyalty to the Constitution, and the expected “people power” momentum fizzled out, leaving the plotters isolated and frustrated.

But the failure of these initial plots does not mean the danger has passed. Trillanes predicts that while the threat of a full-blown coup has diminished, the political war will shift to “skirmishes” involving the judicial system. The year 2025 is expected to be defined by a series of high-profile legal actions. First on the list is the potential transmission of an arrest warrant for Senator Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Following closely is the anticipated filing of plunder charges against Vice President Sara Duterte by civil society groups, a move that strikes directly at her political integrity. Additionally, warrants of arrest are expected for lawmakers involved in the massive flood control corruption scandal. These events are predicted to renew hostilities by the second half of January, creating a volatile atmosphere as the nation heads towards the midterm elections.

The internal dynamics of the military, often the kingmaker in Philippine politics, were also highlighted as a major hurdle for the Duterte camp. Trillanes revealed a shocking sentiment among the active officer corps: a distinct lack of appetite for adventure or rebellion. He claims that junior, mid-ranking, and senior officers are not willing to throw away their careers for a cause they do not believe in—specifically, the installation of Sara Duterte. The Vice President is reportedly viewed with suspicion by the military elite, not only for her perceived “Pro-China” stance but also due to concerns about her temperament, which some sources described as “psychologically unstable” and lacking in people skills. This disconnect has led some retired generals to float the idea of a “transition council”—a desperate “none of the above” option to oust Marcos without necessarily handing power to Duterte, though this too lacks constitutional grounding.

The “ICC card” remains a potent weapon in this political chess game. Trillanes argues that the potential detention of former President Rodrigo Duterte by the ICC would, ironically, be a “good thing” for President Marcos. Physically removing the patriarch of the Duterte clan from the local scene would “emasculate” his political forces, leaving his supporters orphaned and directionless, especially since Sara Duterte has reportedly gone her own way and failed to consolidate her father’s base effectively. However, the former senator warns against complacency, noting that the Duterte camp is expert at “gaslighting” and spinning narratives to portray themselves as victims of persecution, a tactic that still resonates with their loyal base.

Economically and politically, President Marcos is not out of the woods. The flood control scams and corruption allegations have severely eroded his political capital. To avoid becoming a “lame duck” president crawling towards 2028, Trillanes suggests that BBM must implement “drastic” and “honest-to-goodness” reforms. This includes tangible relief for the poor through subsidies, tax breaks for the middle class and businesses to restore investor confidence, and a firm hand in prosecuting corruption regardless of alliances. The administration’s ability to deliver these results will likely determine if it can maintain the stability needed to ward off future destabilization attempts.

As the country braces for the political storms of 2025, one thing is clear: the era of “unity” is officially over. The gloves are off, and the battle for the soul of the nation is being fought not just in the halls of Congress and the Senate, but in the courts, the barracks, and the streets. Whether BBM can hold the fort remains to be seen, but the coming year promises to be one of the most turbulent in recent history, with the fate of the presidency hanging in the balance.